"Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars."

“The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.”
– Henry Kissinger

In this episode we update a classic article written by Andrew Mack back in 1975. As I feel strongly enough that a 50-year-old article is worth re-investigating and much of this analysis is based on Mack’s original conclusions, I highly recommend you read the original which is easily available in digital format. Its full title is “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict” and it appeared in the journal World Politics, Volume 27.

How do massively outnumbered, outgunned, out-trained, and out-supplied guerillas sustain themselves in the field indefinitely? What explains the paradox that even though the big nations win the key battles, such as the US with the Tet Offensive and the French in Algiers, they nevertheless find themselves in a weaker strategic position? Would the outcomes have been different if the civilian leaderships did not tie the hands of their militaries? These are rabbit holes that have some unsettling implications.