#137 – Andreas Mogensen on whether effective altruism is just for consequentialists

09/08/22 • 141 min

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Effective altruism, in a slogan, aims to 'do the most good.' Utilitarianism, in a slogan, says we should act to 'produce the greatest good for the greatest number.' It's clear enough why utilitarians should be interested in the project of effective altruism. But what about the many people who reject utilitarianism?

Today's guest, Andreas Mogensen — senior research fellow at Oxford University's Global Priorities Institute — rejects utilitarianism, but as he explains, this does little to dampen his enthusiasm for the project of effective altruism.

Links to learn more, summary and full transcript.

Andreas leans towards 'deontological' or rule-based theories of ethics, rather than 'consequentialist' theories like utilitarianism which look exclusively at the effects of a person's actions.

Like most people involved in effective altruism, he parts ways with utilitarianism in rejecting its maximal level of demandingness, the idea that the ends justify the means, and the notion that the only moral reason for action is to benefit everyone in the world considered impartially.

However, Andreas believes any plausible theory of morality must give some weight to the harms and benefits we provide to other people. If we can improve a stranger's wellbeing enormously at negligible cost to ourselves and without violating any other moral prohibition, that must be at minimum a praiseworthy thing to do.

In a world as full of preventable suffering as our own, this simple 'principle of beneficence' is probably the only premise one needs to grant for the effective altruist project of identifying the most impactful ways to help others to be of great moral interest and importance.

As an illustrative example Andreas refers to the Giving What We Can pledge to donate 10% of one's income to the most impactful charities available, a pledge he took in 2009. Many effective altruism enthusiasts have taken such a pledge, while others spend their careers trying to figure out the most cost-effective places pledgers can give, where they'll get the biggest 'bang for buck'.

For someone living in a world as unequal as our own, this pledge at a very minimum gives an upper-middle class person in a rich country the chance to transfer money to someone living on about 1% as much as they do. The benefit an extremely poor recipient receives from the money is likely far more than the donor could get spending it on themselves.

What arguments could a non-utilitarian moral theory mount against such giving?

Many approaches to morality will say it's permissible not to give away 10% of your income to help others as effectively as is possible. But if they will almost all regard it as praiseworthy to benefit others without giving up something else of equivalent moral value, then Andreas argues they should be enthusiastic about effective altruism as an intellectual and practical project nonetheless.

In this conversation, Andreas and Rob discuss how robust the above line of argument is, and also cover:

• Should we treat thought experiments that feature very large numbers with great suspicion?
• If we had to allow someone to die to avoid preventing the World Cup final from being broadcast to the world, is that permissible?
• What might a virtue ethicist regard as 'doing the most good'?
• If a deontological theory of morality parted ways with common effective altruist practices, how would that likely be?
• If we can explain how we came to hold a view on a moral issue by referring to evolutionary selective pressures, should we disbelieve that view?

Chapters:

Rob’s intro (00:00:00)
The interview begins (00:01:36)
Deontology and effective altruism (00:04:59)
Giving What We Can (00:28:56)
Longtermism without consequentialism (00:38:01)
Further differences between deontologists and consequentialists (00:44:13)
Virtue ethics and effective altruism (01:08:15)
Is Andreas really a deontologist? (01:13:26)
Large number scepticism (01:21:11)
Evolutionary debunking arguments (01:58:48)
How Andreas’s views have changed (02:12:18)
Derek Parfit’s influence on Andreas (02:17:27)

Producer: Keiran Harris
Audio mastering: Ben Cordell and Beppe Rådvik
Transcriptions: Katy Moore

Links to learn more, summary and full transcript.

Andreas leans towards 'deontological' or rule-based theories of ethics, rather than 'consequentialist' theories like utilitarianism which look exclusively at the effects of a person's actions.

What arguments could a non-utilitarian moral theory mount against such giving?

In this conversation, Andreas and Rob discuss how robust the above line of argument is, and also cover:

Chapters:

Rob’s intro (00:00:00)
The interview begins (00:01:36)
Deontology and effective altruism (00:04:59)
Giving What We Can (00:28:56)
Longtermism without consequentialism (00:38:01)
Further differences between deontologists and consequentialists (00:44:13)
Virtue ethics and effective altruism (01:08:15)
Is Andreas really a deontologist? (01:13:26)
Large number scepticism (01:21:11)
Evolutionary debunking arguments (01:58:48)
How Andreas’s views have changed (02:12:18)
Derek Parfit’s influence on Andreas (02:17:27)

Producer: Keiran Harris
Audio mastering: Ben Cordell and Beppe Rådvik
Transcriptions: Katy Moore

Previous Episode

#136 – Will MacAskill on what we owe the future

People who exist in the future deserve some degree of moral consideration.
The future could be very big, very long, and/or very good.
We can reasonably hope to influence whether people in the future exist, and how good or bad their lives are.
So trying to make the world better for future generations is a key priority of our time.

This is the simple four-step argument for 'longtermism' put forward in What We Owe The Future, the latest book from today's guest — University of Oxford philosopher and cofounder of the effective altruism community, Will MacAskill.

Links to learn more, summary and full transcript.

From one point of view this idea is common sense. We work on breakthroughs to treat cancer or end use of fossil fuels not just for people alive today, but because we hope such scientific advances will help our children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren as well.

Some who take this longtermist idea seriously work to develop broad-spectrum vaccines they hope will safeguard humanity against the sorts of extremely deadly pandemics that could permanently throw civilisation off track — the sort of project few could argue is not worthwhile.

But Will is upfront that longtermism is also counterintuitive. To start with, he's willing to contemplate timescales far beyond what's typically discussed.

A natural objection to thinking millions of years ahead is that it's hard enough to take actions that have positive effects that persist for hundreds of years, let alone “indefinitely.” It doesn't matter how important something might be if you can't predictably change it.

This is one reason, among others, that Will was initially sceptical of longtermism and took years to come around. He preferred to focus on ending poverty and preventable diseases in ways he could directly see were working.

But over seven years he gradually changed his mind, and in *What We Owe The Future*, Will argues that in fact there are clear ways we might act now that could benefit not just a few but *all* future generations.

The idea that preventing human extinction would have long-lasting impacts is pretty intuitive. If we entirely disappear, we aren't coming back.

But the idea that we can shape human values — not just for our age, but for all ages — is a surprising one that Will has come to more recently.

In the book, he argues that what people value is far more fragile and historically contingent than it might first seem. For instance, today it feels like the abolition of slavery was an inevitable part of the arc of history. But Will lays out that the best research on the topic suggests otherwise.

If moral progress really is so contingent, and bad ideas can persist almost without end, it raises the stakes for moral debate today. If we don't eliminate a bad practice now, it may be with us forever. In today's in-depth conversation, we discuss the possibility of a harmful moral 'lock-in' as well as:

• How Will was eventually won over to longtermism
• The three best lines of argument against longtermism
• How to avoid moral fanaticism
• Which technologies or events are most likely to have permanent effects
• What 'longtermists' do today in practice
• How to predict the long-term effect of our actions
• Whether the future is likely to be good or bad
• Concrete ideas to make the future better
• What Will donates his money to personally
• Potatoes and megafauna
• And plenty more

Chapters:

Rob’s intro (00:00:00)
The interview begins (00:01:36)
What longtermism actually is (00:02:31)
The case for longtermism (00:04:30)
What longtermists are actually doing (00:15:54)
Will’s personal journey (00:22:15)
Strongest arguments against longtermism (00:42:28)
Preventing extinction vs. improving the quality of the future (00:59:29)
Is humanity likely to converge on doing the same thing regardless? (01:06:58)
Lock-in scenario vs. long reflection (01:27:11)
Is the future good in expectation? (01:32:29)
Can we actually predictably influence the future positively? (01:47:27)
Tiny probabilities of enormous value (01:53:40)
Stagnation (02:19:04)
Concrete suggestions (02:34:27)
Where Will donates (02:39:40)
Potatoes and megafauna (02:41:48)

Producer: Keiran Harris
Audio mastering: Ben Cordell
Transcriptions: Katy Moore

Next Episode

#138 – Sharon Hewitt Rawlette on why pleasure and pain are the only things that intrinsically matter

What in the world is intrinsically good — good in itself even if it has no other effects? Over the millennia, people have offered many answers: joy, justice, equality, accomplishment, loving god, wisdom, and plenty more.

The question is a classic that makes for great dorm-room philosophy discussion. But it's hardly just of academic interest. The issue of what (if anything) is intrinsically valuable bears on every action we take, whether we’re looking to improve our own lives, or to help others. The wrong answer might lead us to the wrong project and render our efforts to improve the world entirely ineffective.

Today's guest, Sharon Hewitt Rawlette — philosopher and author of The Feeling of Value: Moral Realism Grounded in Phenomenal Consciousness — wants to resuscitate an answer to this question that is as old as philosophy itself.

Links to learn more, summary, full transcript, and full version of this blog post.

That idea, in a nutshell, is that there is only one thing of true intrinsic value: positive feelings and sensations. And similarly, there is only one thing that is intrinsically of negative value: suffering, pain, and other unpleasant sensations.

Lots of other things are valuable too: friendship, fairness, loyalty, integrity, wealth, patience, houses, and so on. But they are only instrumentally valuable — that is to say, they’re valuable as means to the end of ensuring that all conscious beings experience more pleasure and other positive sensations, and less suffering.

As Sharon notes, from Athens in 400 BC to Britain in 1850, the idea that only subjective experiences can be good or bad in themselves -- a position known as 'philosophical hedonism' -- has been one of the most enduringly popular ideas in ethics.

And few will be taken aback by the notion that, all else equal, more pleasure is good and less suffering is bad. But can they really be the only intrinsically valuable things?

Over the 20th century, philosophical hedonism became increasingly controversial in the face of some seemingly very counterintuitive implications. For this reason the famous philosopher of mind Thomas Nagel called The Feeling of Value "a radical and important philosophical contribution."

In today's interview, Sharon explains the case for a theory of value grounded in subjective experiences, and why she believes the most popular counterarguments are misguided.

Host Rob Wiblin and Sharon also cover:

• The essential need to disentangle intrinsic, instrumental, and other sorts of value
• Why Sharon’s arguments lead to hedonistic utilitarianism rather than hedonistic egoism (in which we only care about our own feelings)
• How do people react to the 'experience machine' thought experiment when surveyed?
• Why hedonism recommends often thinking and acting as though it were false
• Whether it's crazy to think that relationships are only useful because of their effects on our subjective experiences
• Whether it will ever be possible to eliminate pain, and whether doing so would be desirable
• If we didn't have positive or negative experiences, whether that would cause us to simply never talk about goodness and badness
• Whether the plausibility of hedonism is affected by our theory of mind
• And plenty more

Chapters: