
The Legend of Dugout Doug
09/13/22 • 70 min
1 Listener
As you know, the nation is going through a process of reviewing Confederate leaders through a clearer lens, clearing away the mythology around them that emerged to justify their actions after the end of the Civil War. I see this as right and appropriate.
But I also think it’s time to contemplate General MacArthur through a clearer lens. And if we do this, we realize:
- He was an unabashed liar, regularly committing what we would refer at Annapolis as honor violations of the type that would have gotten any other military officer fired.
- He was a narcissist of the degree to which made George Patton look like a humble man.
- He was self-delusional about his military prowess, believing that he and he alone had the ability to win this war in a largely naval theater, when in fact his actions likely extended it.
- He was a known pedophile who at the age of 50 took in a 16-year-old girl as his live-in concubine
- As Army Chief of Staff he used Army mounted cavalry and tanks against protesting World War I veterans in an event referred to as the Bonus March demonstrations.
- In my view, rather than being a military genius, for his part in the execution of questionable campaigns that contributed to the deaths of thousands of Americans, I see him as the worst American general since another General Mac— George McClellan.
- About the only good thing I can say about him is he performed admirably in World War I when he far less responsibility and in his leadership of occupied Japan.
A lot of this is going to sound like 20-20 hindsight, but in the military we have this thing called the After Action Report or AAR that is 100% 20-20 hindsight. The whole purpose of the AAR is to overcome the fog of war and look back on what really happened so that we can learn from it.
As you know, the nation is going through a process of reviewing Confederate leaders through a clearer lens, clearing away the mythology around them that emerged to justify their actions after the end of the Civil War. I see this as right and appropriate.
But I also think it’s time to contemplate General MacArthur through a clearer lens. And if we do this, we realize:
- He was an unabashed liar, regularly committing what we would refer at Annapolis as honor violations of the type that would have gotten any other military officer fired.
- He was a narcissist of the degree to which made George Patton look like a humble man.
- He was self-delusional about his military prowess, believing that he and he alone had the ability to win this war in a largely naval theater, when in fact his actions likely extended it.
- He was a known pedophile who at the age of 50 took in a 16-year-old girl as his live-in concubine
- As Army Chief of Staff he used Army mounted cavalry and tanks against protesting World War I veterans in an event referred to as the Bonus March demonstrations.
- In my view, rather than being a military genius, for his part in the execution of questionable campaigns that contributed to the deaths of thousands of Americans, I see him as the worst American general since another General Mac— George McClellan.
- About the only good thing I can say about him is he performed admirably in World War I when he far less responsibility and in his leadership of occupied Japan.
A lot of this is going to sound like 20-20 hindsight, but in the military we have this thing called the After Action Report or AAR that is 100% 20-20 hindsight. The whole purpose of the AAR is to overcome the fog of war and look back on what really happened so that we can learn from it.
Previous Episode

Fall of the Philippines and Japanese Blitzkrieg
- Why did the Japanese invade the Philippines in the first place?
- Why after so much warning, especially after the attack on Pearl Harbor, were the American forces so unprepared to meet a Japanese attack?
- Why were the aircraft not dispersed?
- Why was there so little American air defense?
- Mac’s belief that Japanese suffered a defeat at Pearl? Excuse for not acting more aggressively?
-We’ve harangued the Army Air Corps, as they were called then, enough I guess, lets focus on other commands. What about the Navy? Where was the Asiatic Fleet?
-What was MacArthur’s plan to meet the invaders? What did he want to do?
-Why would that simply not work?
-Talk about the US tanks that ran out of gas trying to get to Lingayen? Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics.
-Mac’s change in strategy from War Plan Orange to “defend the beaches, hit ‘em where they ain’t” was ludicrous.
-He had nowhere near the resources to do this. Ironically, it was the Japanese that succeeded in “hitting ’em where they ain’t.”
-Needs to be said: Gen Short pilloried for loss of Hawaii with no warning. Mac had warning and received Medal of Honor.
-Once the Japanese landed on Luzon in their main assault on December 22, they advanced rapidly, running over most resistance they came across. The largest amphibious invasion in history, to that point, was wildly successful. Another large landing occurred and now the Japanese had two armies advancing on Manila.
-With such numbers on the American and Filipino side, why did this happen?
-Admiral Hart was one of the first leaders to publicly say that the Philippines were indefensible.
Why was this a surprisingly common thought?
- ADM Hart was Annapolis classmate & friend of Mac’s older brother. Knew Mac well, called him Douglas. Said “Douglas is certain about a lot of stuff that just ain’t so, and is an effective talker, which leads to danger.” Maybe hint at our MacArthur episode?
-Let’s talk about the ineffectiveness of the Cavite submarines that were sortied by Hart
-Staring defeat in the face, what did Mac Arthur do next?
-How did the American forces do in the defense of the Bataan Peninsula?
-Despite their very good showing and heavy casualties inflicted on the Japanese, did they actually have any hope of rescue?
-March 11, MacArthur leaves. By May, the Philippines are surrendered to the Japanese. Over 90,000 Americans and Filipinos are captured.
-How is this news reacted to in the US?
-What does this do to American morale, both in the military and at home?
https://williamtoti.com
Next Episode

A Discussion on Fleet Admiral Nimitz, with special guest Admiral James Stavridis
- Nimitz Pre War
- Who was he and where did he come from?
- Texas Hill Country, Fredericksburg
- Too poor to go to college, worked his tail off to go to Naval Academy
- Spent time in Japan before the war
- Nimitz was a submarine officer in his early years
- Commanded a DD in the Philippines
- Commanded a cruiser division and battleship division
- XO of SC, CO Chicago
- Highly experienced in the realm of command
- Nimitz Upon Assignment as CINCPAC
- 56 Years Old currently occupying the office of the Bureau of Navigation
- Whose decision was it to promote Nimitz to the position?
- FDR
- He had been offered the job before December 41 and turned it down for fear of upsetting senior officers.
- He was junior to some 50 other Admirals
- He feared that taking the job and leapfrogging them would have created resentment and made it more difficult to do the job.
- Nimitz the Leader
- What kind leadership style did Nimitz utilize?
- He was a people person
- Never cussed, raised his voice or dressed men down in public
- He gave his subordinates a lot of autonomy and assumed they knew their jobs until they proved they did not
- If that occurred, he spoke in low tones, was blunt but not rude or insulting
- Always looked after his men and took care of them
- Nimitz the Executive
- Juggled personalities of subordinates and his boss extremely well
- Dealings with King
- Dealings with subordinates
- Turner
- GEN Smith
- Halsey
- Towers
- JO Richardson
- MacArthur
- Spruance and Nimitz relationship
- Nimitz handled the various personalities in the Pacific in check much as Ike did in the ETO.
- Was very similar to Ike in terms of Supreme Commander, even though, Nimitz was no Supreme Commander
- What did Nimitz inherit in December 41 and how did he go about fixing the problems?
- Inherited a shattered command
- Devastated morale
- Staff, fleet and populace
- Fear of a Japanese invasion
- When he landed in Pearl on Xmas Day he asked about the relief of Wake
- When told it fell and was abandoned, he fell silent
- Didn’t take command immediately. Worked with Admiral Pye to get the lay of the land, latest issues and intel.
- Took command on December 31, 1941 aboard USS Grayling (SS-209) fittingly
- Nimitz’s Strategy 1941-42
- Be cautious, yet forceful and hit them where they least expect it
- Strike back was essential
- (Set the stage for next episode about the Hit and Run Raids)
- Nimitz’s biggest gamble
- Midway
- Recognized the role of intel and believed in it, believed in his people and their skills
- Nimitz’s Legacy
- Developed and implemented the island hopping strategy that won the war.
- Inherited a shattered fleet, trusted his subordinates, built his leadership teams and won when it was absolutely necessary.
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