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Dare to know! | Philosophy Podcast - Understanding Noam Chomsky #2: Naturalism, Mental Representation, & Computation (with Frances Egan)

Understanding Noam Chomsky #2: Naturalism, Mental Representation, & Computation (with Frances Egan)

Dare to know! | Philosophy Podcast

06/30/20 • 58 min

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This conversation is part of the 'Understanding Noam Chomsky' Series ('Dare to know!' Philosophy Podcast). Today we are joined by Frances Egan who is a Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. She has authored a number of articles and book chapters on philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, and perception. Today, we will talk in particular about Professor Egan's article in the book ‘Chomsky and his Critics’ called ‘Naturalistic Inquiry: Where does Mental Representation Fit in?’.

06/30/20 • 58 min

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